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Although disparate impact theory often is touted as an important 
remedy for workplace inequality, in practice, it is less frequently 
used.  Nevertheless, the theory can be a meaningful remedy for 
gender violence survivors who are subjected to adverse employment 
actions or termination for reasons that may not appear facially 
gendered.  An employee may argue that the action had an 
impermissible gender-based disparate impact due to the 
disproportionate number of survivors who are women.  Consequently, 
disparate impact would seem a natural remedy.  This Article reviews 
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infrequently explored issues that could be interpreted to limit the 
theory’s utility.  It concludes that those limitations should not bar the 
theory’s use.  Instead, disparate impact should offer an alternative 
remedy for the hidden role domestic and sexual violence plays in 
perpetuating women’s economic inequality. 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
lthough disparate impact theory has been touted as one of the 
most important and controversial developments in employment 
discrimination law,1 in practice, it is less frequently used.2  On its 
face, this may seem surprising, given the challenges of proving 
discriminatory intent as part of a disparate treatment claim and recent 
scholarship demonstrating the ways that unconscious bias, rather than 
intentional discrimination, accounts for inequalities at work.3  
Although some recent commentators have criticized the doctrine,4 
others have called for its revival.5 
This Article joins the dialog about the practical and potential utility 
of disparate impact theory by arguing that it should be applied to 
cases evaluating the theory’s applicability to a particular set of cases: 
those involving terminations of domestic violence survivors.  The 
Article situates the issue in the context of two debates: one about the 
applicability of disparate impact theory and the other about the 
economic stability of domestic violence survivors.  In cases in which 
a survivor is terminated or otherwise subjected to an adverse job 
 
1 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 701, 702 (2006). 
2 See, e.g., Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: 
What’s Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597 (2004) (arguing that 
disparate impact litigation is a largely untapped resource that currently is not making a 
major impact on employment discrimination law). 
3 Recent articles discussing the role of unconscious bias include, e.g., Tristin K. Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate 
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95–99 (2003); Anthony G. Greenwald 
& Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 
(2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 
ALA. L. REV. 741, 745–50 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral 
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006). 
4 See infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
A
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action because she6 has been the victim of abuse, she may argue that 
the action had an impermissible gender-based disparate impact due to 
the disproportionate number of survivors who are women.7  This 
Article evaluates the viability of that claim.  The Article reviews and 
dismisses doctrinal arguments that could be raised to bar survivors’ 
claims.  Instead, allowing such claims would advance the doctrine’s 
purpose of eradicating employment practices with discriminatory 
consequences.8 
Elsewhere I have argued that adverse actions taken against 
domestic or sexual violence survivors should be analyzed as sex 
discrimination under disparate treatment theory.9  Accordingly, courts 
would recognize an unexplained adverse action against a domestic or 
sexual violence survivor as raising an inference of discrimination that 
the employer then could rebut through proof that the employer 
engaged in an interactive process with the employee but could not 
resolve the employment-related concern without taking the adverse 
action.10  That approach would encourage human resources’ “best 
practices” and safety planning at work.11  The approach would require 
decisions to be based on work-related determinations rather than on 
inaccurate stereotypes about abuse survivors.12  This analysis of 
disparate impact complements that proposal by evaluating an 
alternative legal theory.  I argue that the theory should be available to 
domestic violence survivors, just as others subjected to adverse 
employment actions may bring both disparate treatment and disparate 
impact claims, and that doctrinal objections flatly barring such claims 
are inconsistent with the doctrine’s history and purpose. 
The Article first reviews both the theoretical underpinnings and the 
current doctrinal requirements of the statutory disparate impact claim.  
 
6 Studies consistently show that the vast majority of victims of domestic and sexual 
violence are women.  See, e.g., CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001 (2003), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (concluding that eighty-five percent of 
all victimizations by intimate partners in 2001 were against women); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, STATISTICAL TABLES INDEX, tbl.2 (reporting that ninety-two percent of all sexual 
assaults in 2005 were committed against women). 
7 See, e.g., RENNISON, supra note 6; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6. 
8 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
9 See Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of 
Sex Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 73–78 (2008). 
10 Id. at 111. 
11 Id. at 102–03. 
12 Id. at 107–14. 
GOLDSCHEID 10/28/2011  10:31 AM 
36 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 33 
The Article then focuses on two issues that might pose challenges to 
domestic violence survivors’ bringing claims.  The first is the 
question whether a single employment decision should be considered 
a “particular employment practice” subject to disparate impact 
review.  The second is the question of how to define the appropriate 
comparator group in cases such as these in which the criterion for the 
decision is closely linked to membership in a protected class.  The 
Article concludes that disparate impact claims brought by domestic 
violence survivors subjected to adverse employment actions because 
of their experience with abuse fall squarely within the category of 
cases contemplated by Congress and the Court in recognizing 
disparate impact claims. 
A.  Disparate Impact: A Theory of Limits or Untapped Potential? 
Generally speaking, disparate impact theory allows recovery when 
an employment policy or practice that is neutral on its face has a 
disparate impact on a protected group and the policy or practice is not 
justified by business necessity.13  Disparate impact theory has most 
frequently been used in the context of written employment tests or 
explicit job requirements; the theory has been less successful when 
invoked outside those contexts.14  Some theorists argue that the 
theory has had a limited effect and that it is not a promising vehicle 
for future change.  For example, Michael Selmi argues that the theory 
ultimately was a mistake and that a broader definition of intentional 
discrimination (under disparate treatment) would more effectively 
eradicate employment discrimination.15  Other theorists similarly 
critique disparate impact as a tool for redressing inequality in today’s 
workplaces.16  Some scholars have identified practical limits, such as 
 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006). 
14 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 1, at 705, 738–67 (noting that disparate impact theory has 
produced limited results outside of testing context); Shoben, supra note 2, at 598 (asserting 
that disparate impact theory has largely untapped potential); Charles A. Sullivan, 
Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 
954 (2005) (noting “little development” in disparate impact law since the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act). 
15 Selmi, supra note 1, at 706–07. 
16 See, e.g., Green, supra note 3 at 136–44 (urging a focus on structural workplace 
dynamics); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1231–37 (1995) (arguing that implicit bias should be recognized as a form of intentional 
discrimination). 
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the lack of jury trial, limited remedies, and statutory exemptions, as 
reasons disparate impact theory is not more widely used.17 
Yet others argue for the theory’s expanded application.  For 
example, Charles Sullivan urges a “return to, and revival of, the 
disparate impact theory.”18  He reviews and counters theoretical as 
well as doctrinal objections while arguing that disparate impact holds 
a “brighter promise” for expansion than does disparate treatment 
doctrine, particularly given constrained interpretations of disparate 
treatment requirements and our enhanced understandings of 
unconscious discrimination.19  Michelle Travis argues that disparate 
impact theory holds great potential for addressing gender-based 
workplace inequalities that stem from organizational norms that 
enshrine longstanding inequalities such as those involving 
caregiving.20  Joan Williams and Nancy Segal similarly highlight 
disparate impact’s utility in challenging workplace practices and 
norms that penalize those with caregiving responsibilities.21  Elaine 
Shoben argues that disparate impact is unnecessarily underutilized 
and calls for “creative thinking” about additional applications of the 
theory.22 
This Article picks up on that call and offers one example of an 
application for which the doctrine could afford needed relief.  
Domestic violence survivors may be terminated or subjected to 
 
17 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 968; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn 
and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (2006) (detailing 
limited applications of disparate impact law); Shoben, supra note 2, at 598–99 (citing 
limited damages as well as difficulties of proof, employer savvy, and failure of the 
plaintiffs’ bar to appreciate the theory’s potential as reasons for the theory’s 
underutilization). 
18 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 984. 
19 Id. at 968–1000. 
20 Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 37 (2005). 
21 Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 108–
10 (2003); see also, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of 
“FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of 
Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1344–45 (2008) (arguing for 
application of disparate impact theory to family responsibilities discrimination); accord 
Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 956 (1985) (arguing that disparate impact theory should apply to 
pregnancy-related discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).  But see, e.g., 
Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 567, 615–19 (2010) (arguing that despite its theoretical applicability, disparate impact 
has proven to be of limited utility to pregnant workers). 
22 Shoben, supra note 2, at 607. 
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adverse employment consequences as a result of the abuse.23  
Because domestic violence survivors overwhelmingly are women, 
those adverse employment actions will have a disproportionate impact 
based on sex.  Disparate impact would seem a natural basis for 
redress.  Critics no doubt are correct that the reach of the theory will 
be limited, that law cannot do the work of social movements in 
shifting social norms,24 and that our lack of consensus regarding 
employers’ responsibility for remedying subtle discrimination limits 
prospects for both legal and social change.25  That said, disparate 
impact remains a viable theory, devised to provide redress in cases 
such as these, when “neutral” practices perpetuate prohibited 
discrimination.  Although the number of cases to which this argument 
may apply likely will be small, the analysis offers an example of how 
disparate impact could be a more effective tool in remedying subtle 
discrimination at work. 
B.  Context: Domestic Violence 
The experience of domestic or sexual violence survivors illustrates 
the potential, and some of the challenges, of disparate impact theory.  
Domestic or sexual violence survivors often are subjected to adverse 
employment actions as a result of their experiences with the abuse.  
For example, a domestic violence survivor may be stalked at work by 
her partner, and her employer may terminate her, even in the absence 
of evidence that her partner actually posed a safety threat to the 
workplace.26  Survivors may reflexively be terminated, perhaps due to 
unconscious stereotypes that someone coping with abuse would not 
be able to simultaneously maintain her job or inaccurate assumptions 
about her needs as a result of the abuse.27  In other cases, survivors 
may be disciplined or terminated because the abuser interferes with 
their ability to perform their job functions on time.28  In those cases, 
survivors may bring claims of disparate treatment or hostile 
environment harassment,29 claims of wrongful discharge,30 or claims 
 
23 See infra Part I.B. 
24 See Selmi, supra note 1, at 780–81. 
25 Bagenstos, supra note 17, at 34–40 (calling for enhanced normative principles). 
26 See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 9, at 73–78. 
27 Id. at 87–88, 95–101. 
28 Id. at 73–77. 
29 Id. at 85–88, 91–95. 
30 See, e.g., Apessos v. Mem’l Press Grp., 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 322 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
2002); Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., No. 78421-3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2008).  
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under state or local laws in those jurisdictions that explicitly prohibit 
adverse actions taken on the basis of an employee’s experience as a 
survivor of abuse.31  Those remedies may or may not afford adequate 
relief.32 
Alternatively, a survivor who is terminated because she has been 
subjected to abuse may argue that the termination reflects a facially 
gender-neutral policy that has a disparate impact based on sex.33  For 
example, a survivor may be terminated and told that her termination 
was due to circumstances involving her abuse.  Whether or not a 
survivor discloses that she is coping with abuse, her employer may be 
aware of the problem and may terminate her as a result.  The 
employer may cite performance or attendance issues or may base the 
decision on fears that her abuser will pose safety threats to the 
workplace.  In those cases in which an employer disciplines or 
terminates an employee because of her experience with abuse, the 
 
But see, e.g., Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 606 
S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (rejecting the claim); Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 
1995) (same).  See generally Margaret C. Hobday, Protecting Economic Stability: The 
Washington Supreme Court Breathes New Life in the Public-Policy Exception to At-Will 
Employment for Domestic Violence Victims, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 87 (2010); 
Sandra S. Park, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a “Public Policy” 
Exception to Employment-At-Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 121 (2003). 
31 See, e.g., LEGAL MOMENTUM, WOMEN’S LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, STATE LAW 
GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Sept. 
2010), http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/employment-rights.pdf; see also, e.g., 
Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State 
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669 
(2008). 
32 See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 9, at 95–104. 
33 Similar arguments have met with mixed results in cases brought by survivors and 
their families who allege that law enforcement’s failure to respond appropriately to 
domestic violence victims’ calls for help led them to suffer harm.  For example, a number 
of courts have rejected claims.  See, e.g., Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781–
82 (8th Cir. 1994); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994); McKee v. City of 
Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1989).  Others have upheld claims under equal 
protection and substantive due process theories.  See, e.g., Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 
715–17 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding an equal protection claim that domestic violence 
victims were treated less seriously than similar nondomestic violence victims under 
rational basis review); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1529 (D. Conn. 
1984) (rejecting a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim challenging police policy of 
differential treatment of domestic violence victims); see also, e.g., Okin v. Village of 
Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a survivor’s 
claim that police response violated substantive due process based on state-created danger 
theory).  But see, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (rejecting a 
procedural due process claim by a survivor when law enforcement failed to take action to 
enforce a protective order). 
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decision may be challenged as a facially neutral practice that has a 
disparate impact based on sex.34 
There is an intuitive appeal to this argument, given domestic and 
sexual violence’s disparate impact on women.35  Certainly, if an 
employer had an explicit policy approving adverse employment 
actions taken against domestic violence survivors, such a policy 
would easily be seen as having a gendered impact on the workplace, 
given the disproportionate percentage of women who are victims.  
Indeed, some commentators have concluded that the theory should 
apply easily to these cases.36  But employers are not likely to 
expressly adopt such policies.  Consequently, the issue becomes 
whether an individual employment decision should be insulated from 
disparate impact review because, due to the nature of the decision, it 
is not likely to be either formalized or publicly disclosed.  If disparate 
impact is a tool for rooting out discriminatory workplace decisions 
that either reflect pretext or perpetuate historic inequalities based on 
membership in protected categories including sex, disparate impact’s 
application would seem natural.37 
 
34 The claim might be fashioned in a variety of ways.  It could be framed as a disparate 
treatment claim.  See Goldscheid, supra note 9.  Alternatively, a claim could be framed as 
a challenge to the underlying personnel policy, e.g., the policy regarding absenteeism or 
performance.  But that approach would not accurately capture the claim.  Unlike other 
cases, for example, the “caregiving” challenges in which employees challenge an 
employer’s leave policies as having a disparate impact based on sex or pregnancy, a 
survivor would not be challenging a stated policy.  See infra notes 147–150 for discussion 
of those cases.  Instead, she would be challenging an employment decision for its impact 
on domestic violence survivors. 
35 See RENNISON, supra note 6. 
36 Maria Amelia Calaf, Comment, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic Violence, 
and Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW & INEQ. 167, 186–91 (2003); John E. Matejkovic, 
Which Suit Would You Like? The Employer’s Dilemma in Dealing with Domestic 
Violence, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 309, 336 (2004); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the 
Abused?: Is Termination the Solution When Domestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 294–95 (2006); Nina W. Tarr, Employment and Economic 
Security for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 371, 393–94 
(2007); Wendy R. Weiser & Deborah A. Widiss, Employment Protection for Domestic 
Violence Victims, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POV. L. & POL’Y 3, 6–7 (2004). 
37 Indeed, the connection between domestic violence and sex discrimination is so strong 
that international treaties explicitly equate domestic violence with sex discrimination.  See, 
e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) (stating that violence against women is an “obstacle 
to the achievement of equality” and that it “constitutes a violation of the rights and 
fundamental freedoms of women,” and recognizing that “violence against women is a 
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which 
have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men”).  The persistence 
of sex-based discriminatory attitudes towards survivors could be extended to the 
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Of course, the fact of a termination or other adverse action taken 
against an employee would not by itself trigger liability.  As with 
other cases in which a plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing of 
disparate impact, the employer would be able to defend against 
liability by establishing that the action was job related for the position 
in question and consistent with business necessity.38  Consequently, 
in cases in which performance or attendance problems persisted 
despite the employer’s good faith efforts to help the employee safely 
negotiate ongoing employment despite the abuse, or when safety risks 
to the workplace overall could not be reduced without altering the 
survivor’s job status, the adverse action might be justified and the 
disparate impact claim would fail. 
Analogous arguments have proven successful on behalf of 
domestic violence victims who lose housing based on policies 
disadvantaging domestic violence victims.39  However, employment 
differs from housing in that employers are not likely to maintain 
explicit policies disadvantaging domestic violence survivors whereas 
landlords have maintained such explicit policies.  In addition, at least 
two doctrinal limitations that have evolved in the workplace context 
may render disparate impact arguments difficult to sustain.  First, 
some courts have narrowly construed the statutory requirement that a 
plaintiff prove that a “particular employment practice”40 caused the 
 
employment context, in which termination of domestic violence survivors because of their 
experience as survivors could similarly be treated as sex discrimination. 
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).  See infra Part II.B. 
39 See, e.g., Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. Vt. 2005) (upholding 
sex discrimination claim under Fair Housing Act when landlord sought to evict domestic 
violence victim less than seventy-two hours after her husband assaulted her); Alvera v. 
Creekside Vill. Apts., HUD ALJ No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
Portland, Or., Apr. 16, 2001) (policy discriminating against domestic violence victims 
violate prohibitions on sex discrimination); see also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(9) (2006) 
(providing, inter alia, that applicants for Section 8 housing vouchers cannot be denied 
housing because of their experiences with domestic violence and that an abuser’s actual or 
threatened violence cannot be the basis for adverse decisions regarding the victim’s 
housing); Emily J. Martin, Fair Housing for Battered Women: Preventing Homelessness 
Through Civil Rights Laws, 27 CORNERSTONE 6 (2005), available at http://www.aclu.org 
/pdfs/fairhousingforbatteredwomen072806.pdf (discussing theories and citing cases); PUB. 
HOUS. MGMT. & OCCUPANCY DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC 
HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 216–19 (2003) (recommending preferences for 
domestic violence victims and discussing best practices for maintaining victims’ housing 
status).  See generally Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination 
Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377 (2002). 
40 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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disparate impact.41  Second, the survivor would have to establish the 
requisite statistical impact, even though she may have been the only 
employee who she was aware was similarly treated.42  This Article 
will evaluate each of those issues in turn. 
II 
DISPARATE IMPACT: TESTING THEORY AND DOCTRINE 
A.  Theory 
The history of disparate impact doctrine’s development as a tool to 
eliminate employment discrimination has been well documented and 
won’t be repeated here.43  What is less settled are its purposes, 
rationales, and goals.  Drawing from the oft-stated original 
articulation in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., disparate impact theory has 
been seen as prohibiting practices that are “fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation.”44  As the Supreme Court stated: 
 The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain 
from the language of the statute.  It was to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in 
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees.  Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests 
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be 
maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status quo of prior 
discriminatory employment practices.45 
The Court saw Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate as 
demanding the removal of all “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers to employment,” when those barriers have the effect of 
 
41 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 14, at 976–79 (discussing limitations); Travis, supra 
note 20, at 36–40. 
42 Cf., e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White 
Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2027 (1995) (discussing difficulty in 
identifying policies and their impact in a hypothetical claim by an African American 
woman who was denied promotion). 
43 See, e.g., Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and 
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 431 (2005); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Kingsley R. 
Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification of Griggs, a Partial 
Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287 (1993); Martha 
Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory 
and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983); Selmi, supra 
note 1, at 708–33. 
44 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
45 Id. at 429–30. 
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discriminating against a historically disadvantaged group.46  It saw 
Congress’s goal of equal opportunity as encompassing the removal of 
all “‘built-in headwinds’” to equality.47  In other words, if the 
employer’s conduct operates to exclude or disadvantage protected 
groups, the conduct would be permitted only if it is related to job 
performance.48 
Yet this language doesn’t fully capture the doctrine’s underlying 
theory or its goals.  Richard Primus has posited two primary potential 
rationales.49  In his view, disparate impact can be seen either as an 
“evidentiary dragnet designed to discover hidden instances of 
intentional discrimination” or as a “more aggressive attempt to 
dismantle racial hierarchies regardless of whether anything like 
intentional discrimination is present.”50  He concludes that an account 
that focuses on breaking down historical hierarchy and persistent 
segregation is preferable to approaches that focus on the employer’s 
state of mind.51  Sullivan identifies two potential rationales that 
describe the same, or very similar concerns: reaching intentional 
discrimination in cases that lack proof of disparate treatment and 
removing unnecessary barriers based on the history of discrimination 
and subordination.52  Under both views, disparate impact draws on 
antidiscrimination law’s conceptual roots in tort law by recognizing 
that discrimination consists of conduct rather than a state of mind and 
by defining “intent” to include the likelihood that a given result will 
flow from a given action.53  The two rationales generally track two 
 
46 Id. at 431. 
47 Id. at 432. 
48 Id. at 431. 
49 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 494, 518–36 (2003).  Others have adopted his framework in their analyses 
of disparate impact discrimination.  See, e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test 
for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 779 (2009). 
50 Primus, supra note 49, at 518.  Others have also seen the focus of disparate impact as 
focusing on the risk that the challenged practice incorporates or reflects pretext.  See, e.g., 
George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of 
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1339–43 (1987). 
51 Primus, supra note 49, at 536.  Others agree that framing the theory in terms of 
effects rather than intent holds greater potential to advance equality.  See, e.g., Pamela L. 
Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 526 
(1991). 
52 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 964–66. 
53 Blumrosen, supra note 43, at 71–72. 
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competing visions of workplace equality: equal treatment and equal 
achievement.54 
The latter rationale in particular, in which disparate impact is 
viewed as a tool to address historic barriers, seems consistent with the 
structural approach advocated by those who advocate new approaches 
to workplace inequality.55  In that sense, it may be thought to be an 
effective tool for addressing subconscious discrimination.56  Notably, 
Linda Krieger, in her landmark work identifying the role of 
“unconscious” discrimination in employment inequality, argues that 
disparate impact is an ill-suited tool for addressing unconscious 
discrimination.57  She criticizes disparate impact as a vehicle for 
addressing the subjective practices that often are not recognized under 
disparate treatment’s current requirement of discriminatory intent.58  
She views the original purpose of disparate impact law as addressing 
particular problems that had arisen as Title VII evolved.59  She argues 
that disparate impact was not designed to go beyond those contexts to 
address systems of subjective practices.60  Instead, in her view, 
disparate treatment should be reconceptualized to reflect the role of 
cognition, rather than intent, in the realistic operation of 
discriminatory decisions.61  This critique stands in some tension with 
accounts of those involved in the Griggs litigation and related policy 
development, which define disparate impact discrimination broadly in 
terms of consequence.62 
 
54 Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the 
Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 
224–25 (1990); see also, e.g., Julia Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The 
Application of Title VII’s Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 869, 903 (1985) 
(arguing that disparate impact reflects an equal opportunity concept of equality with goals 
of eliminating historical, social, and structural barriers that impede achievement for 
minority group members and recognizing the present effects of past discrimination). 
55 See sources cited supra note 3. 
56 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 49, at 532–35. 
57 Krieger, supra note 3, at 1231. 
58 Id. at 1230.  She rejects disparate impact as a “fix” for challenging those practices, 
citing practical concerns with validation studies, political problems with the cost of the 
validation studies that would be required, and theoretical problems with the fit between the 
original intent of disparate impact theory and the subjective practices with which she is 
concerned.  Id. at 1231–37. 
59 Those problems are employers’ substitution of facially neutral criteria for previously 
used race-based classifications and similar reliance on eligibility criteria associated with 
successful performance in stereotypically male jobs.  Id. at 1237. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1241–43. 
62 Blumrosen, supra note 43, at 62, 73. 
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From a policy perspective, both approaches require courts to 
balance the impact of neutral policies that have a discriminatory effect 
against an employer’s legitimate right to promulgate policies 
regardless of racial or gendered effects if they truly are directed to 
central business (or governmental) concerns.63  Cases involving 
domestic violence survivors may fall under both categories, in that 
they may reflect masked discriminatory intent (pretext) or decisions 
that perpetuate historic gender-based discriminatory practices.  
Accordingly, disparate impact would be applicable under either 
theoretical approach. 
B.  Doctrine 
1.  Statutory Requirements 
Congress’s 1991 codification of disparate impact as a theory of 
relief for employment discrimination provides that a plaintiff can 
establish disparate impact discrimination by showing that a 
“particular employment practice” causes a disparate impact against an 
employee in a group protected by the statute.64  The employer then 
has the burden of establishing that the practice is job related for the 
position and consistent with business necessity.65  Even if the 
employer makes that showing, the plaintiff can prevail if she 
establishes that an “alternative employment practice” exists and that 
the employer refuses to adopt it.66  Consequently, proof of both a 
“particular employment practice” and an impermissible disparate 
impact are key to sustaining a claim.  For disparate impact theory to 
apply to a termination or other adverse action taken against a 
domestic violence survivor, a court would first have to recognize the 
adverse action taken against an individual as a “particular 
employment practice” that falls within the statute.  As one court 
noted, there is “precious little” case law on the meaning of 
 
63 Lamber, supra note 54, at 903. 
64 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin).  Even if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that each 
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, the court may treat 
the entire decision-making process as one employment practice if the plaintiff 
demonstrates that the elements of an employer’s decision-making process are not capable 
of separation for analysis.  Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
65 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
66 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
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“employment practice” as the term is used in disparate impact cases.67  
Courts consistently apply the doctrine to “practices” such as discrete 
testing procedures or job requirements68 or express personnel 
policies.69  However, some courts conclude that the theory would not 
extend, for example, to employment decisions that affect a single or 
only a few employees, or to employment actions that could be 
characterized as “single decisions” or “isolated incidents.”70  This 
could be problematic for a domestic violence survivor.  In addition to 
the likely absence of an explicit policy authorizing adverse actions 
against domestic violence survivors, a survivor may have difficulty 
identifying others who also were subject to an adverse action because 
of their status as survivors.  Yet the statutory language, legislative 
history, and the principles underlying the theory do not justify 
precluding a disparate impact claim on this ground alone. 
Although Title VII generally defines “unlawful employment 
practices,”71 it does not define or elaborate how that definition is 
meant to differ from the “particular employment practice[s]” required 
by the separate provision spelling out proof requirements for disparate 
impact claims.72  As Michelle Travis argues, the term “particular” 
was used to clarify the issue addressed in Wards Cove73 concerning 
whether an employee could state a prima facie disparate impact case 
solely by identifying a “bottom-line” statistical disparity between the 
 
67 Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 377 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
68 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (applying disparate impact 
analysis to high school diploma requirement); see also, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U.S. 321 (1977) (applying disparate impact to challenge height and weight requirements). 
69 For example, policies requiring commencement of leave upon pregnancy would be 
subject to disparate impact review.  See Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 
670 (9th Cir. 1980). 
70 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.2. 
71 The statute declares: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
72 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
73 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
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percentage of the employer’s workforce that was made up of 
members of a protected category and the percentage of that category 
in the relevant labor pool.74  That issue addresses a concern with 
causation, not a concern about the type of neutral decision that might 
create a disparate impact.  In other words, by using the term 
“particular,” Congress sought to ensure that an employer-authorized 
practice, rather than some other unrelated factor, caused the 
challenged disparity.75  Accordingly, the statute requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that each practice causes the disparity, unless she can 
establish that the elements of the employer’s decision-making process 
cannot be separated for analysis, in which case the combined 
processes would be treated as a “particular employment practice.”76  
The use of the term “particular” therefore clarifies how to handle 
“bottom-line disparities” and does nothing to disturb the Griggs 
decision’s recognition that a broad range of employment decisions 
would be subject to disparate impact challenge.77 
The 1991 Civil Rights Act’s legislative history confirms that the 
use of the word “particular” reflects Congress’s concern with 
causation in cases involving “bottom-line disparities” rather than an 
effort to limit the types of practices subject to disparate impact 
challenges.78  As L. Camille Hébert chronicles, the legislative history 
reflects Congress’s recognition that disparate impact has been, and 
may be, applied to a “wide variety of practices” including tests, job 
requirements, leave or other personnel policies, or “other subjective 
or objective” evaluation procedures or practices.79  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that disparate impact may be used to 
challenge “subjective” employment decisions, such as the method for 
awarding or denying promotions.80  That disparate impact challenges 
have not been widely successful outside the testing context does not 
mean that they could or should not be successful in appropriate cases. 
 
74 Travis, supra note 20, at 80; see also Muñoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 
2000) (recognizing that disparate impact cannot be used to challenge “cumulative effects 
of an employer’s practices”). 
75 Travis, supra note 20, at 80–82. 
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B). 
77 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
78 See, e.g., Browne, supra note 43, at 328–39 (reviewing legislative history of 
“particular employment practice” requirement). 
79 L. Camille Hébert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive 
Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 380 & n.151 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 34 
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 572–76; H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 16 
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 709). 
80 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988). 
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2.  “Single Decision” Cases 
This Part reviews the limited universe of reported cases in which 
defendants have challenged the applicability of disparate impact 
theory by arguing that the employment decision at issue was a “single 
decision” and not a “particular employment practice” that would be 
subject to disparate impact review.  If a domestic violence survivor 
brought a disparate impact challenge to her termination or other 
adverse action, the claim might be characterized as raising this “single 
decision” issue.81 
The question whether disparate impact theory applies when 
subjective decisions may be characterized as “single employment 
decisions” has been considered, but not rigorously analyzed, in a 
relatively small number of decisions.  Some courts have recognized 
that a decision can have a discriminatory disparate impact even if it 
was a “single decision” that did not reflect an official or repeatedly 
applied policy.  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust itself was a case 
involving a small employer, and the Court there recognized that 
single decisions could perpetuate discrimination.82  If the purposes of 
disparate impact theory are to eliminate the “headwinds” that interfere 
with equality and to facilitate challenges to decisions that have the 
effect of adversely impacting a protected group and lack business 
justification, one would expect all manner of neutral decisions that 
have a negative impact on a protected group to be subject to review, 
regardless of the number of employees affected.  Accordingly, a 
domestic violence survivor should not have to establish that her 
employer adopted a formal policy sanctioning adverse actions against 
survivors of domestic violence in order to bring a disparate impact 
challenge. 
In many cases, courts treat disparate impact in a manner that is 
consistent with the theory’s stated purpose of eliminating hidden 
discrimination by upholding claims that suggest pretext, even absent 
traditional proof of disparate treatment.  For example, in Council 31, 
 
81 A preliminary question may be whether the decision is the type that is properly 
subject to disparate impact review.  Although disparate impact is most often thought of in 
the context of objective criteria such as tests, it is an important tool for challenging 
subjective practices such as terminations or other adverse actions.  See, e.g., id. 
(confirming applicability of disparate impact analysis to subjective employment decisions 
such as hiring, compensation, and promotions); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 
U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (listing “subjective decision making” as among the practices that 
could be challenged under disparate impact theory). 
82 487 U.S. at 990–91. 
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American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. 
Ward, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a disparate impact 
challenge to a layoff decision that allegedly had a racially 
discriminatory impact.83  The appellate court reversed the lower 
court’s dismissal and rejected the conclusion that a disparate impact 
challenge must identify a “repeated, customary method of operation,” 
and that it would not apply to a single layoff decision.84  The 
appellate court reasoned that a decision barring from disparate impact 
challenges employment practices that may be characterized as a 
“single decision” would be “analytically unmanageable” because 
“almost any repeated course of conduct can be traced back to a single 
decision.”85  As another court stated, the criteria should be whether a 
practice is sufficiently specific and focused for the court to be able to 
address “whether it is a pretext for discrimination in light of the 
employer’s explanation for the practice.”86  Indeed, a number of 
claims involving single layoff decisions have been recognized as 
cognizable under disparate impact theory, even if the plaintiffs 
ultimately did not prevail on the merits.87 
Similarly, other challenges to termination decisions or to aspects of 
hiring practices have been upheld even though the challenged practice 
might have been characterized as a “single decision” and did not 
involve formal policies or procedures.  For example, in Chaney v. 
Southern Railway Co., the court allowed the plaintiff’s disparate 
impact claim to proceed based on the former employee’s argument 
that he had been terminated as a result of an employer-administered 
drug test that had a disparate impact based on race.88  The court did 
not require proof that the test had been used in other instances or that 
its use was part of the employer’s official policy or procedures.  
Similarly, in Conroy v. Johanns, the court allowed a claim to proceed 
based on the argument that the employer’s decision to advertise a 
 
83 978 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1992). 
84 Id. at 376. 
85 Id. at 377. 
86 Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
87 See, e.g., Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 2003) (alleging so-called 
“balanced workforce initiative” generated reports that set specific racial goals for jobs at 
particular grade levels led to subsequent reduction in percentage of black employees); cf. 
Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing disparate 
impact challenge to layoff decision though finding no statistical impact); Nolting v. 
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 799 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1986) (same). 
88 847 F.2d 718, 725 (11th Cir. 1988). 
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position in a job category that required a college degree had a 
gendered disparate impact.89  The court rejected the argument that the 
decision did not constitute an “employment practice” because the 
plaintiff had established inconsistencies in how jobs were posted that 
could constitute a “standard practice” and that might indicate a pretext 
for discrimination.90  The court did not require a formal showing of a 
stated policy; instead it allowed the plaintiff the opportunity to 
establish facts that would show a practice that had a gendered impact. 
In other cases, courts have recognized that claims involving an 
adverse action taken against an individual could be subject to a 
disparate impact challenge, even though the claims in those cases 
ultimately failed for lack of statistical evidence.  A concern about 
whether the decisions reflected a pretext for discrimination seemed to 
drive the court.  For example, in Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 
the court recognized that an employer’s refusal to admit the plaintiff 
to its management training program could be subject to a disparate 
impact challenge.91  The court reasoned that the employer’s policy 
with respect to program admission was sufficiently narrow to suggest 
that it might be a “ploy” to “practice discrimination.”92  Rather than 
taking a formalistic approach and requiring a stated policy or 
evidence of repeated conduct, the court recognized that a lack of 
apparent business justification for the employment decision might 
reflect the type of discriminatory decision disparate impact theory 
was intended to address.93 
This flexible approach hews more closely to the broad-sweeping 
intent reflected in both Griggs and the 1991 Civil Rights Act (CRA).  
To the extent courts are charged with balancing a concern with 
perpetuating the effects of discrimination with employers’ interests in 
maintaining valid business practices, the “business necessity” aspect 
of the equation,94 rather than the “employment practice” requirement, 
 
89 No. 2:06-cv-867, 2007 WL 1830725 (D. Utah June 22, 2007). 
90 Id. at *7. 
91 646 F.2d 444, 452 (10th Cir. 1981). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (setting forth proof requirements under 
which a claim will fail if an employer establishes that the challenged practice is job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity).  For discussion of the 
business necessity defense, see, e.g., Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in 
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387 (1996); Andrew C. 
Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of 
Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996). 
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should do the work of protecting the employer’s interest.  The 
employer should be required to justify its decision if its practice raises 
the specter of enshrining or reproducing historic discrimination. 
Nevertheless, a number of courts have rejected claims on the 
ground that the plaintiff did not identify a “particular employment 
practice” within the meaning of the statute.  As Sullivan argues, the 
objections are not categorically unfounded, but they are 
“overdrawn.”95  When closely examined, virtually all of these 
decisions reflect what seem to be concerns with causation or concerns 
that disparate impact theory should not be applied in a way that would 
endorse quotas or other public policies or that would interfere with 
employers’ legitimate, or at least traditional, business practices 
(though that analysis would more properly fall within the “business 
necessity” defense).96  Nevertheless, some courts go further in 
rejecting claims even though the challenged practices could 
reasonably be seen as falling within the theory’s reach. 
One group of cases purports to reject claims because the plaintiff 
failed to identify a particular employment practice, but a close reading 
of the decisions reveals an underlying concern with a failure to 
establish causation between the employment decision and the 
prohibited disparate impact.97  For example, in Pouncy v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America, plaintiffs challenged three aspects of the 
employer’s practices they claimed had a disparate impact based on 
race.98  Although the court stated that those practices were different 
from selection procedures such as educational requirements and 
aptitude tests, it really was concerned about whether the challenged 
practices caused the alleged racial disparities.99  The court recognized 
that the plaintiffs presented statistics showing that blacks were 
overrepresented in the lower levels of the employer’s workforce but 
 
95 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 976. 
96 See, e.g., Browne, supra note 43, at 327–29 (explaining how a “particularity” 
requirement addressed concerns that disparate impact challenges to general decision-
making processes would lead to routine bottom-line challenges, impair an employer’s 
ability to select the most qualified candidate, and pressure employers to engage in quota 
hiring); accord Selmi, supra note 1, at 753 (noting courts’ willingness to approve 
“common business practices” despite their disparate impact). 
97 See, e.g., Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982); 
accord Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277 (5th Cir. 1994). 
98 Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 801 (dismissing the three “practices” of failing to post job 
openings, the use of a “level” system, and the use of subjective evaluation criteria, as 
unlike the selection procedures to which the disparate impact model traditionally has been 
applied). 
99 Id. 
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found that the statistics did not establish that the three selected 
“practices” caused those disparities.100  Thus, although the court 
couched its decision in terms of the plaintiff’s failure to identify 
specific practices, its real concern seemed to reflect the issue 
addressed in the 1991 CRA regarding whether or when “bottom line” 
disparities could be subject to disparate impact review.101 
Similarly, in Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., the court found 
that the plaintiffs’ challenge to a “practice” of requiring applicants to 
fill out job applications at the plant failed because plaintiffs had not 
identified a “specific aspect” of the employers’ practice.102  But, as in 
Pouncy, the court’s real concern was causation: the court explained 
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a “causal connection” 
between the alleged policy and the racial imbalance with which the 
plaintiffs were concerned.103 
Another group of decisions involved “comparable worth” cases in 
which courts rejected disparate impact challenges to compensation 
systems that resulted in gender-based disparities.104  These decisions 
state that they rejected claims because the challenges did not involve 
sufficiently specific “employment practices.”105  However, the courts’ 
reasoning reflected policy concerns about comparable worth and a 
reluctance to invoke disparate impact law to impose liability when an 
employer applied longstanding market-based compensation 
systems.106  For example, the court in American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees v. Washington, found that the 
challenge did not involve the type of “specific, clearly delineated 
employment practice applied at a single point in the job selection 
 
100 Id. at 801–02. 
101 See sources cited supra notes 78–80. 
102 Anderson, 26 F.3d at 1284. 
103 Id. 
104 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Muni. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 
(9th Cir. 1985); Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984). 
105 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n, 770 F.2d at 1405–06; Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 707. 
106 In another decision that also can be seen as declining to use disparate impact 
analysis to challenge an employer’s settled policies, the court in Kelber v. Forest Electric 
Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rejected a disparate impact claim by an 
electrician who was fired due to excessive absences because, in part, her claims that the 
defendant’s “job assignment and termination policies have a disparate impact on pregnant 
women” was not sufficiently specific.  Id. at 333.  The court concluded that the plaintiff 
had failed to identify any “specific” employment practice that affected pregnant women.  
The court also found that the plaintiff had failed to establish the requisite impact.  Id.  But 
it is difficult to imagine how the plaintiff, an electrician in a field and job no doubt 
dominated by men, could establish that any policy had a disparate impact on women, 
never mind pregnant women. 
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process,” which, in its view, properly would be the subject of 
disparate impact challenges.107  It objected to the use of disparate 
impact theory to “interfere” with complex compensation systems 
grounded in “surveys, agency hearings, administrative 
recommendations, budget proposals, executive actions and legislative 
enactments,” and which were “responsive to supply and demand and 
other market forces.”108  The court in Spaulding v. University of 
Washington identified related concerns that allowing disparate impact 
challenges in comparable worth claims would stretch the theory 
beyond where it was intended to go.109  That court saw the disparate 
impact model as a means to challenge particular employment 
practices that were not obviously job related and was concerned that 
the theory could be used instead as a means to interfere with the 
market.110  Regardless of whether the policy judgment that accepted 
market-based practices fall outside the scope of disparate impact 
review (presumably because they would not impermissibly enshrine 
prohibited discrimination) is correct, these cases should be seen as 
hinging on particular policy concerns rather than on an analysis of the 
“particular employment action” requirement. 
Decisions in related contexts reflect a similar judicial reluctance to 
interfere with established market-based practices.  In Finnegan v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., the court rejected an age discrimination 
claim, concluding that the employer’s financially driven wage and 
fringe-benefits cuts were not the type of employment practices 
disparate impact was designed to address.111  In the court’s opinion, 
Judge Posner described the policies subject to disparate impact 
challenge as policies that “gratuitously––needlessly—although not 
necessarily deliberately, excluded black or female workers from equal 
employment opportunities.”112  Judge Posner recognized that the 
theory readily would apply to policies that originally had been 
adopted for discriminatory purposes, but that had not been changed 
when the employer eliminated deliberate discrimination.113  He 
distinguished those cases from the type of across-the-board 
compensation reductions brought on by financial adversity that were 
 
107 Am. Fed’n, 770 F.2d at 1405. 
108 Id. at 1406. 
109 Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 707. 
110 Id. 
111 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992). 
112 Id. at 1164. 
113 Id. 
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not the legacy of deliberate age discrimination.114  In this sense, the 
court explicitly drew on one of the identified rationales of disparate 
impact theory—eliminating the effects of past discrimination—to 
reject a claim it found outside the doctrine’s historic scope.  That 
reasoning would not preclude claims based on a single decision that 
perpetuated historically discriminatory biases. 
Other pre-1991 CRA cases have rejected challenges based on 
determinations that the policy could not be attributed to actions that 
were not employer initiated.  These decisions can be seen as related to 
those discussed above concerning causation.115  They draw on the 
concept, embedded in the 1991 CRA, that the “policy” must be driven 
by the employer, rather than other factors such as historical practice, 
or the market, to be subject to disparate impact review.  But courts 
apply this concept in a highly formalistic way.  For example, in Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Chicago Miniature 
Lamp Works, the court found that the employer’s passive reliance on 
employees’ word of mouth for recruitment was not a “particular 
employment practice” within the statutory meaning because it relied 
on the employees’ rather than the employer’s actions.116  Similarly, in 
Beard v. Whitley County REMC, the court rejected a challenge to 
differential wages and benefits earned by two categories of employees 
because the compensation packages were found to be the result of 
separate negotiation processes with different unions, not any 
affirmative steps taken or practices undertaken by the employer.117  
Although the reasoning identifies a credible concern that challenged 
decisions should stem from employer-driven acts, these decisions 
draw an artificial line between employer and employee- or union-
driven conduct, when the policies might instead be traced to the 
employer’s actions or acquiescence.118  Notably, other courts have 
taken different approaches to similar claims.  For example, in contrast 
to EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Thomas v. Washington County School Board, 
recognized that policies and practices of nepotism and word-of-mouth 
 
114 Id. 
115 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 98–103. 
116 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991). 
117 840 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1988). 
118 See Travis, supra note 20, at 42–43 (criticizing the reasoning of EEOC v. Chicago 
Miniature Lamp Works). 
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hiring served to “freeze the effects of past discrimination” and had a 
disparate impact based on race.119 
A few other decisions may prove problematic for a domestic 
violence survivor because they explicitly found alleged “practices” 
that affected only a single or a few individuals inappropriate for 
disparate impact review.  Some decisions reflexively state that 
disparate impact claims must be directed towards “systemic” results 
of employment practices.120  At least one court indicated that a 
“discretionary” decision to deny a new mother leave would not be 
“appropriate” for disparate impact review.121  These cases seem to 
reflect the view that disparate impact review is only suitable for 
explicit, formal policies—a view that was rejected in Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank and Trust.122 
On close review, however, the facts of those cases seem to reflect 
the courts’ judgment that the claims lacked merit rather than on a 
categorical judgment whether a “single decision” might ever be 
subject to a successful disparate impact challenge.  For example, in 
Harper v. Godfrey Co., which involved circumstances surrounding 
and following a strike by unionized workers, the court rejected a 
challenge alleging that the employer’s creation of a seniority list had a 
racially disparate impact.123  The court first reasoned that the 
composition of a seniority list cannot be called a “policy or practice” 
for disparate impact purposes because it “was a single decision.”124  
The court insisted that to be subject to disparate impact review, the 
plaintiffs had to establish that the “manner” in which the list is 
prepared constitutes a policy that has a disparate impact.125  The court 
dismissed the policies identified by the plaintiffs but found that even 
if the court recognized the alleged policies for purposes of the 
challenge, their “limited magnitude” would nevertheless doom the 
claims.126 
Similarly, in Wright v. National Archives and Records Service, the 
court rejected a claim by an African American civil service employee 
 
119 915 F.2d 922, 925–26 (4th Cir. 1990). 
120 See Harper v. Godfrey Co., 839 F. Supp. 583, 604 (E.D. Wis. 1993), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 45 F.3d 143 (7th Cir. 1995); Wright v. Nat’l Archives & 
Records Svc., 609 F.2d 702, 712 (4th Cir. 1979). 
121 Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1988). 
122 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988). 
123 Harper, 839 F. Supp. at 604. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 605. 
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that a series of incidents relating to the agency’s training programs 
discriminated on the basis of race.127  The court found that the various 
actions that allegedly led to the plaintiff’s denial of promotion were 
not the type of facially neutral “policy or practice” subject to 
disparate impact challenge.128  The court was concerned that of the 
four employees allegedly affected by the “practices,” only one was 
alleged to have suffered any harm that was allegedly 
discriminatory.129  The decision went on to reject the plaintiff’s 
disparate treatment claims notwithstanding a dissenting opinion that 
would have upheld plaintiff’s claims on that theory, and concluded by 
characterizing the grievance as growing “out of a positively motivated 
intention to better the employment conditions of minority 
employees.”130  Thus, in addition to the court’s concern that no 
adverse impact was established, the court also appeared unwilling to 
hold an employer liable for what the court deemed to be good faith 
efforts to diversify the workplace.131 
Likewise, in Bramble v. American Postal Workers Union, a case 
sometimes referred to for the proposition that disparate impact does 
not apply to decisions that affect a single employee,132 the court 
rejected an age discrimination claim by a former union president who 
alleged that a newly adopted salary structure that had eliminated his 
salary had an age-based disparate impact.133  The court was troubled 
both that there was no indication that the plaintiff’s age was a factor 
in the decision, whether stated or unstated, and that the plaintiff could 
not establish that others would be similarly affected.134  The court 
seemed to be concerned that the employer’s decision was not 
sufficiently linked—either through veiled intent or impact—to the 
protected category of age. 
At least two other decisions state that they reject sex-based 
disparate impact claims because the challenged employment decisions 
were “isolated incidents.”  In Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., the court 
 
127 609 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1979). 
128 Id. at 711–13. 
129 Id. at 712. 
130 Id. at 718. 
131 This concern seems misplaced because an employer’s good faith efforts typically are 
not considered as part of a disparate impact claim, which addresses discriminatory impact 
rather than intent. 
132 See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 346 (6th ed. 2003). 
133 135 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1998). 
134 Id. at 26. 
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rejected a challenge by a pregnant female attorney who was also the 
only part-time employee, that the elimination of her position had a 
sex-based disparate impact.135  The court first rejected her disparate 
treatment claim because her position was terminated before her 
employer learned that she was pregnant.136  The court then rejected 
her disparate impact claim based both on the conclusion that the 
decision to eliminate her position was only an isolated, one-time 
decision and not an employment practice, and on the plaintiff’s failure 
to prove that an alleged policy of terminating part-time employees 
would have a disparate impact on women.137  According to the court, 
the plaintiff’s cited studies, showing that the majority of part-time 
workers were women with child-care responsibilities, were not 
sufficiently “indisputable” for the court to take judicial notice of 
them.138  The decision has been criticized as improperly relieving the 
employer of any obligation to demonstrate that its criteria were 
consistent with business needs.139  Its limited reasoning—both with 
respect to the reason why the decision doesn’t qualify as a sufficiently 
specific practice and why the proffered studies were rejected without 
analysis—offers little guidance for future courts. 
Similarly, in Wynn v. Columbus Municipal Separate School 
District, the court rejected a female athletic coach’s challenge to her 
school board’s decision to combine the position of head football 
coach and athletic director because the decision effectively precluded 
women from the position.140  The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
proffered statistical proof based on the conclusion that the job 
description would have a disparate impact on both men and women 
because both men and women would not be qualified for the position 
as it had been structured.141  In its focus on the statistical deficiencies, 
the court stated that “discriminatory impact cannot be established by 
one isolated decision such as the one involved here.”142  Because she 
was the only female coach who had ever applied, she could not 
establish that the requirement would have the actual effect of 
 
135 118 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1997). 
136 Id. at 1156. 
137 Id. at 1156–57. 
138 Id. 
139 Travis, supra note 20, at 43; see also, e.g., Grossman, supra note 21, at 617 
(critiquing the decision). 
140 692 F. Supp. 672, 682–83 (N.D. Miss. 1988). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 684. 
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excluding a disproportionate number of women.143  The court 
required a comparison of the female coaches who had applied to and 
been rejected for the position of athletic director because of their lack 
of qualifications for the job of head football coach.144  Thus, even 
though the court stated that it rested its decision, at least in part, on 
the plaintiff’s failure to identify a “particular employment practice,” 
the court’s reasoning focused more on the perceived lack of disparate 
impact.145  One could imagine the “practice” being framed in terms of 
the changed job description combining the football coach and athletic 
director positions.  So framed, a court might have reached a different 
result.  Notably, the court upheld the plaintiff’s disparate treatment 
claim.146 
Thus, despite a number of decisions involving “single employment 
decisions” that seemingly reject cases based on the failure to satisfy 
the “particular employment practice” requirement, in fact, only a few 
cases actually stand for the premise that the “practice” must affect 
more than a single employee, and even those may be explained by 
other concerns.  Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the “particular 
employment practice” requirement narrowly in related contexts even 
when not addressing whether the challenged practice constituted a 
“single employment decision.”  Grossman and Travis detail courts’ 
narrow interpretations of the “particular employment practice” 
requirement in a number of cases with claims involving “caregiving”-
related employment decisions.147  Some of these decisions insulate 
traditional practices, particularly practices involving leaves, from 
disparate impact review.148  But other courts have recognized similar 
leave policies as “particular employment practices” that had a sex-
 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 683. 
145 See discussion of proper comparison groups infra Part I.C. 
146 Wynn, 692 F. Supp. at 686. 
147 See Grossman, supra note 21, at 617–18; Travis, supra note 20, at 39–46. 
148 Travis, supra note 20, at 39–46.  For example, in Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
the court characterized the employer’s policy offering employees with more than three 
absences during a ninety-day probationary period (which disproportionately affected 
pregnant women) as a challenge to the absence of sufficient leave.  282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th 
Cir. 2002).  In the court’s view, the leave policy would produce an effect that was contrary 
to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s explicit refusal to guarantee leave to pregnant 
employees, and the court refused to recognize a policy that it would subject to disparate 
impact review.  Id. at 861–62; see also Grossman, supra note 21, at 617; Travis, supra 
note 20, at 43. 
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based disparate impact.149  Rather than reflecting a reasoned analysis 
of the “single employment decision” requirement, some of these 
decisions seem to turn on courts’ views that upholding the challenge 
would be tantamount to requiring leave, which, in some courts’ 
views, is contrary to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), and 
which would be a “warrant for favoritism.”150  Whether or not that 
judgment is correct, either as a normative matter or as a matter of 
interpretation of the PDA’s reach, the decisions illustrate how 
disparate impact decisions may instead reflect substantive policy 
judgments when the claims invoke controversial national policy 
issues such as comparable worth151 or mandatory parenting leave.  
Cases involving adverse actions taken against domestic violence 
victims should not invoke those same concerns.152 
C.  Establishing Impact 
The next question is how a court would evaluate whether a claim 
establishes the requisite statistical impact.  Disparate impact theory 
arose, and is most often used, in the context of exclusionary hiring 
practices.153  Accordingly, in analyzing impact, courts generally 
compare the percentage of employees in the protected class in the 
workplace with the percentage of qualified individuals in the relevant 
population pool.154  Indeed, employers are required to maintain 
records of the impact of their “tests and other selection procedures” 
on employment opportunities for those in protected classes.155  The 
so-called “four-fifths rule” provides that a selection rate for any 
 
149 See, e.g., Williams & Bornstein, supra note 21, at 1344 n.228 (citing favorable 
results in cases challenging an employer lifting requirement of 150 pounds, a police 
department policy allowing light duty only for on-the-job injuries, and a policy that 
employees could not use sick days to care for sick children). 
150 Grossman, supra note 21, at 616 (noting cases that state the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act does not provide preferential treatment); see, e.g., Stout, 282 F.3d at 
861–62 (rejecting a challenge to an absenteeism policy reasoning that to uphold challenge 
would require special leave for pregnant employees). 
151 See cases cited supra notes 104–10. 
152 Indeed, at least some courts have recognized that an employer’s adverse action 
against a domestic violence survivor would violate public policy.  See sources cited supra 
note 30. 
153 Calaf, supra note 36, at 187; see also, e.g., Selmi, supra note 1, at 733–53 (arguing 
that disparate impact theory has not been successful outside of cases challenging 
employment tests). 
154 See, e.g., LEX K. LARSON, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 22.02 (Lexis 2d ed. 
2011). 
155 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2010). 
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protected group that is less than four-fifths of the rate for the group 
with the highest selection rate will generally be regarded as evidence 
of adverse impact.156  Federal regulations directing employers how to 
comply with antidiscrimination law’s disparate impact prohibition 
recognize that smaller differences in selection rates may constitute an 
adverse impact when the difference is significant statistically or 
practically, or when the employer’s actions have disproportionately 
discouraged applicants.157  Similarly, greater differences in selection 
rates may not constitute adverse impacts where the differences are 
based on small numbers or where other factors, such as special 
recruiting, impact the numbers.158  This statistical calculation applies 
most readily to hiring tests and explicit job requirements in which the 
percentage of employees who identify as members of a particular 
protected class can be compared against the relevant labor pool. 
With an employment practice such as a decision to terminate, 
transfer, or demote an individual worker, the comparison works 
somewhat differently.  Courts that have addressed these cases have 
taken different approaches, but their results vary and often employ 
limited analyses.  The Supreme Court has made clear that no rigid 
mathematical formula is required in order to establish a disparate 
impact.159  Instead, courts are directed to judge the significance of the 
disparity flexibly on a case-by-case basis.160  Some courts have 
permitted proof without relying on statistics.161  Others explicitly 
recognize that cases in which there is a “paucity” of statistics may 
nevertheless reflect impermissible disparate impact discrimination.162  
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s authority, however, some decisions 
state that the plaintiff must present a statistical showing of impact,163 
 
156 Id. § 1607.4(D). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994–95 (1988). 
160 Id. at 995. 
161 Shoben, supra note 2, at 606 (citing Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Texas, 97 F.3d 
810, 814 (5th Cir. 1996)); accord Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: 
Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1123 & n.224 
(2010). 
162 Thomas v. Wash. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 926 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding a 
disparate impact challenge to nepotism and word-of-mouth job posting practices). 
163 Grossman, supra note 21, at 618 (citing cases).  The cases raise the question whether 
courts insist on statistical evidence because it is doctrinally required or because it affords a 
justification for rejecting a claim about which the court is unsympathetic.  For example, in 
Lang v. Star Herald, the court rejected the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim because the 
plaintiff provided no statistical support for her challenge to the newspaper’s policy of 
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and some seem to require a workplace large enough to establish a 
statistically significant claim.164 
In the domestic violence context, one question will be whether a 
plaintiff must establish proof of a disparate impact on her workplace 
or whether proof of impact on the general population will suffice.165  
Some courts evaluate the impact of the decision on the protected class 
generally.166  Courts seem to be most willing to use general 
population statistics in cases in which the decision is based on some 
characteristic that is closely related to membership in the protected 
class, what might be called a “class-linked” characteristic.  For 
example, courts in some of the cases involving “no-beard” policies 
have recognized that those policies would have a disparate impact on 
African American males, given their vulnerability to 
pseudofolliculitis barbae (PFB).167  A number of courts have upheld 
disparate impact challenges to “no-beard” policies based on evidence 
of how that policy would affect the class (African American males) 
generally.168  However, at least one court required proof that the “no-
 
allowing indefinite unpaid leaves of absence but with no guarantee that the employer 
would hold open the employee’s position.  107 F.3d 1308, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997).  Like 
cases described in notes 148 and 150, supra, the court may have been unwilling to issue a 
decision it viewed as requiring an employer to offer a particular type of leave.  Similarly, 
in Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District 212, the court ostensibly required 
statistics but did so in the course of rejecting a claim that, in the court’s view, would 
require the employer to extend the maternity leave it already offered.  939 F.2d 440, 443–
44 (7th Cir. 1991). 
164 See, e.g., Lang, 107 F.3d at 1314 (noting employee’s concession that employer was 
too small for statistical analysis); Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. 
Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting the potential difficulty in establishing the 
requisite statistical impact in cases involving “single decisions”). 
165 See Flagg, supra note 42, at 2026–27 (recognizing the issue); Grossman, supra note 
21, at 618 (citing cases). 
166 See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 939 F.2d 610, 612–13 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(upholding a disparate impact claim involving a “no-beard” policy based on studies and 
expert testimony that policy discriminates against black males who disproportionately 
suffer from skin disorder brought on by shaving); accord Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l 
Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding a disparate impact claim concerning 
a pregnancy-related leave without analysis of statistical impact in plaintiff’s workplace). 
167 PFB is a skin disorder resulting from ingrown hairs when people with certain kind of 
hair are clean shaven.  If affects virtually only African American males.  See, e.g., Equal 
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Colo. 1981) 
(discussing medical evidence). 
168 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. at 56–59 
(rejecting the argument that statistics regarding percentage of African American men in 
defendant’s workforce would preclude disparate impact claim based on “no-beard” 
policy); accord Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing 
the district court’s conclusion that a “no-beard” policy has a disparate impact on African 
American males); Johnson v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 713 F. Supp. 244, 247 (W.D. Tenn. 
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beard” policy had a disparate impact in the defendant’s workplace 
itself.  In that case, it may have mattered that the protected group was 
well represented in the workplace notwithstanding the policy.169  In 
the case of a class-linked policy such as a “no-beard” policy, 
requiring proof that the policy has had a disparate impact on the 
protected group’s representation at a particular workplace would seem 
to hide the fact that the policy would have a disproportionate negative 
effect on African Americans overall.  Employment decisions based on 
an employee’s experience with domestic violence would be similarly 
class linked, given its predominant impact on women.  Disparate 
impact claims brought on the basis of abuse similarly should be 
analyzed in terms of their impact in the general population rather than 
in the plaintiff’s workplace itself. 
Courts have used general population statistics in cases challenging 
pregnancy or caregiving-related policies when the criteria at issue are 
arguably class linked.  For example, in Roberts v. United States 
Postmaster General, the court found that a policy prohibiting an 
employee from using her accumulated sick leave to attend to family 
members’ medical needs may have a sex-based disparate impact.170  
That policy could be seen as class linked, given women’s 
disproportionate assumption of caregiving responsibilities.  In a 
similar ruling, the court in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc. found 
 
1989) (recognizing that a “no-beard” policy would have racial disparate impact unless the 
employer allowed a medical exception to accommodate PFB); Richardson v. Quik Trip 
Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (same).  But see, e.g., Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 190–93 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(rejecting a claim based on the plaintiff’s failure to prove that a “no-beard” policy had a 
racially discriminatory impact in defendant’s workforce).  Even cases rejecting challenges 
to “no-beard” policies did so based on a finding crediting the defendant’s satisfaction of 
the business necessity defense rather than the absence of a disparate impact.  See, e.g., 
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a claim based 
on business necessity grounds, while “assuming” that firefighters adequately pled prima 
facie case that a “no-beard” policy had racial disparate impact); Stewart v. City of 
Houston, No. H-07-4021, 2009 WL 2849728 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2009) (upholding a “no-
beard” policy for uniformed officers based on evidence that facial protective equipment 
could not safely be worn with a beard); Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 
42 (E.D. Va. 1976) (recognizing that a “no-beard” policy had “some discriminatory 
impact” but finding the policy justified by a legitimate business purpose). 
169 See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d at 
190–93 (rejecting a claim based on failure to prove that a “no-beard” policy had a racially 
discriminatory impact in the defendant’s workforce). 
170 947 F. Supp. 282, 289  (E.D. Texas 1996).  Although the court relied on the general 
assertion that the policy would have a disparate impact on women due to their “more 
frequent role as child-rearers,” the court did not elaborate on the type of proof the plaintiff 
would be required to provide to ultimately prevail. 
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that a rule barring pregnancies in single employees would have a 
gender-based disparate impact based on higher fertility rates among 
black women in the population.171  The explicit distinction based on 
the status of being unmarried and pregnant could be seen as a class-
linked criterion that should be evaluated in terms of its impact on the 
general population, not on a particular workforce.  Similarly, other 
courts have used general population statistics in recognizing that 
pregnancy and caregiving-related policies might have a disparate 
impact.172  At the same time, other courts have used the plaintiff’s 
workplace as a comparator and nevertheless upheld claims.173 
On the other hand, some courts, particularly in cases challenging 
policies that could be seen as less closely class linked, have rejected 
claims based on the absence of proof that the policy 
disproportionately affected members of a protected class in the 
plaintiff’s workplace.174  As with cases analyzing whether the 
decision satisfied the “single employment decision” requirement, a 
close look reveals that some of these decisions seem driven by 
substantive policy-related concerns rather than by the plaintiff’s 
failure to establish impact per se.175  For example, some decisions 
 
171 834 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 1987). 
172 For example, one court recognized that a policy requiring nurses to lift over 150 
pounds might have a disparate impact on pregnant woman.  See Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. 
of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 812 (5th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 143 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting the claim based on a lack of evidence that no pregnant woman could lift 150 
pounds).  In another case, the court recognized that a policy limiting temporary 
employees’ leave to ten days affected women more severely than men.  Abraham v. 
Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
173 See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 
647, 651–55 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that a policy requiring employees to work for one 
year before taking paid sick leave had a disparate impact on pregnant women); Germain v. 
County of Suffolk, No. 07-CV-2523, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45434 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 
2009) (holding that a policy limiting light-duty assignments only to officers who suffer 
occupational injuries had a disproportionate impact on pregnant women). 
174 See, e.g., Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(rejecting a challenge to absenteeism and job assignment policies by an electrician who 
was fired for excessive pregnancy-related absences both because she failed to identify a 
specific policy and because she failed to establish impact); Davidson v. Franciscan Health 
Sys., 82 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774–75 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (rejecting the challenge to a twenty-
six-week leave policy by an employee who already had taken a leave absent evidence that 
any other employee who had been terminated for exceeding the policy was pregnant); see 
also, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1034 (1986) (criticizing disparate impact theory for requiring 
proof of impact on a particular employer’s workplace over a limited time period); Porter, 
supra note 36, at 294–95 (recognizing cases requiring workplace statistics); Tarr, supra 
note 36, at 393–94 (same). 
175 See supra notes 106–14 and accompanying text. 
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suggest an unwillingness to use disparate impact doctrine to disturb 
settled workplace policies such as light-duty assignments.176  Others 
reflect a view that granting the plaintiff’s claim would effectively 
authorize “preferential treatment” for pregnant employees, a policy 
determination Congress explicitly rejected in the PDA.177  Other 
courts have recognized, or have assumed for purposes of analysis, that 
the plaintiff may have established a prima facie case, but found that 
the employer nevertheless established a business necessity.178 
Overall, this body of decisions offers little analysis of the proper 
statistical comparison courts should use when cases invoke statistics.  
One of the most extensive discussions can be found in Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Warshawsky & Co., in 
which the court considered a challenge that the employer’s policy 
requiring all employees to work at least one year before they were 
eligible for sick leave had a disparate impact based on pregnancy and 
sex.179  The court rejected the statistical approaches urged by both 
parties and concluded that the applicable comparison was the 
percentage of females terminated because of the policy during their 
first year with the percentage of males similarly terminated during 
that same period.180  That approach seems reasonably suited to the 
 
176 See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(rejecting a nurse’s assistant’s challenge to a policy limiting modified duty to employees 
who suffered from work-related injuries absent evidence that the policy had a 
disproportionate impact on pregnant employees); Dimino v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 64 F. 
Supp. 2d 136, 157–58 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting a challenge to a policy prohibiting light 
duty for medically limited employees absent evidence that women transit workers lose 
more work time than men due to policy); Woodard v. Rest Haven Christian Servs., No. 07-
C-0665, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21086 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2009) (rejecting a nurse’s 
challenge to a policy limiting light-duty work to those who are disabled on the job because 
the plaintiff did not present evidence of impact at her place of employment). 
177 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1314–16 (11th Cir. 
1994); Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist., 939 F.2d 440, 443–44 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(rejecting the challenge to a policy requiring teachers to use either sick leave or maternity 
leave based on the plaintiff’s failure to establish that women who have been disabled due 
to pregnancy accumulate sick days at a greater rate annually than male coworkers or 
women who have not experienced pregnancy-related disability; concluding that the effect 
instead was to prevent women who choose to remain at home after the end of pregnancy-
related disability from using sick days to cover periods of disability); see also supra note 
163 and accompanying text. 
178 See, e.g., Ahmad v. Loyal Am. Life Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 1114, 1115 (S.D. Ala. 
1991); Porter v. Kansas, 757 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 (D. Kan. 1991). 
179 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
180 Id. at 654.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued that the court 
should compare the percentage of pregnant first-year employees who were discharged 
because of the policy with the percentage of all nonpregnant first-year employees who 
were discharged because of the policy.  Id. at 651.  By contrast, Warshawsky argued that 
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particular policy involved, which was explicit and which would 
operate affirmatively to terminate existing employees.  But in cases of 
single decisions that are either explicitly based on or have an impact 
based on a class-linked characteristic, such as a “no-beard” policy,181 
a policy banning braided, locked, or twisted hairstyles,182 or a 
decision to terminate an employee because she has survived domestic 
violence, an analysis of the impact of a decision on the plaintiff’s 
workplace itself would not shed light on its overall effect.  In those 
cases, an evaluation of the impact of the decision on the population at 
large seems the better approach. 
D.  Impact of Impact Analysis 
By analyzing how disparate impact doctrine would apply to a 
particular set of cases, this Article does not urge an expansion of the 
doctrine; it simply evaluates infrequently explored aspects of the 
doctrine and argues that some courts have interpreted statutory 
requirements in an unduly restricted way.  The impact of the analysis 
likely will be limited, given the relatively specific nature of the claim 
and its context.  A disparate impact challenge brought by a domestic 
violence survivor is different from many disparate impact cases in 
that the decision does not involve an explicit policy.  In that sense, it 
differs, for example, from those cases involving pregnant women and 
bearded men,183 dress codes,184 or cases involving “English-only” 
rules,185 because those challenges involve facially neutral but 
expressly stated policies, whereas a domestic violence survivor may 
be told that she was terminated because of the abuse, but the 
 
the court should compare the number of pregnant first-year employees who required sick 
leave with the nonpregnant first-year employees who required sick leave.  Id. at 652.  This 
case illustrates the difficulty of identifying the appropriate comparison groups. 
181 See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. 
182 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 161, at 37–39. 
183 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 1, at 749–53 (discussing cases); see also, e.g., Travis, 
supra note 20, at 39–46 (discussing disparate impact challenges to caregiving-related 
inequalities). 
184 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
185 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., 
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the García Cousins Lost Their Accents: 
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the 
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1347 (1997) (discussing cases). 
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employment decision is unlikely to involve an officially stated 
policy.186 
Of course, the decision to terminate a domestic violence survivor 
may be seen as similar to other challenges that generally have not 
succeeded.  For example, a claim by a survivor who was terminated 
due to excessive absenteeism (related to the abuse) may be seen as a 
challenge to the employer’s (gender-neutral) absenteeism policy.  
That challenge could be seen as similar to challenges to absenteeism 
policies brought by employees seeking pregnancy or childcare leave.  
However, cases involving domestic violence survivors generally 
should not invoke the same policy-based concerns to which courts 
have alluded in those cases.187  Alternately, claims by domestic 
violence survivors may be seen as similar to the often unsuccessful 
challenges brought to dress codes or “English-only” policies because 
those cases may be seen as involving issues of the employee’s 
choices.188  Regardless whether that distinction is correct, it should 
not apply to cases involving adverse actions against domestic 
violence survivors, because in those cases the employee’s 
circumstances are caused by the abuser’s, not the employee’s, 
conduct.189 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has evaluated the question of whether adverse 
employment actions taken against survivors of domestic violence 
should be subject to disparate impact challenges.  The Article reviews 
objections that may be raised and concludes that those arguments 
should not bar claims outright.  The issue offers one example of ways 
in which cramped doctrinal interpretations contribute to a perception 
that disparate impact theory is unavailable, particularly outside the 
testing context.  This Article challenges that perception.  The Article 
shows how adverse employment actions taken against domestic 
 
186 Of course, a domestic violence survivor who is terminated for the ostensible reason 
that she violated a standing workplace rule, for example, that she had excessive absences, 
could bring a disparate impact challenge to the impact of that policy on domestic violence 
survivors.  Framed that way, she likely would have difficulty establishing that the overall 
impact of that policy had a discriminatory effect, both because of the relatively small 
percentage of survivors likely to be affected and because the employer likely would 
successfully defend the business necessity of a generic absentee policy. 
187 See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
188 See Flagg, supra note 42, at 2028. 
189 Indeed, any decision based on the employee’s role in the abuse, absent additional 
facts, would perpetuate a stereotype of its own. 
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violence survivors fall within the scope of neutral employment 
decisions the Court and Congress have recognized may perpetuate 
impermissible discrimination. 
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